Turkey’s Hard Democracy: An Interview with Andrew Arato

After Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party, or AKP) took office in 2002, many liberal intellectuals in the field of international relations and political science were convinced that Erdoğan’s leadership could prove that Islam and democracy could coexist and that his leadership would result in a more functional democracy in Turkey. This prediction has already failed.

However, five years ago, in 2010, Professor Andrew Arato, the Dorothy Hart Hirshon Professor of Political and Social Theory in the department of sociology at The New School in New York, best known for his influential book “Civil Society and Political Theory,” coauthored with Jean L. Cohen, was one of the few voices in American academia who repeatedly warned Turkish liberal intellectuals about the authoritarian direction that Erdoğan’s leadership was inclined to. In 2010, Professor Arato explicitly warned Turkish intellectuals that Erdoğan’s project aimed at a version of hyper-presidentialism.

“The 2010 referenda, to me, represented an attempt to conquer yet another branch of the separation of powers, the judiciary. I saw more attractive provisions of the package as window dressing for a monolithic project. It was already clear to me that this project aimed at a version of hyper-presidentialism, and sought to remove all impediments in its way, especially the judiciary that established its jurisdiction over constitutional amendments,” said Professor Arato, adding that there have been many more attempts to realize the same project, either by constitutional change or by the establishing of a de facto hyper-presidential system. “The first failed so far, the second succeeded.”

Professor Arato further elaborates that Turkish liberal intellectuals understandably failed to see the logic of Erdoğan’s actions because of their own conflict with the military tutelage.

“They saw the Constitutional Court as merely an instrument of that tutelage,” said Professor Arato, recalling that liberal intellectuals were fighting the battles of yesterday, rather than the coming one.

“They did not understand that in the Turkish system, especially with a hegemonic party, the court and the judiciary were important counter-weights.”

Sunday’s Zaman sat down with Professor Arato and discussed the ongoing political situation in Turkey as well as what awaits the Turkish people.

Five years ago, in 2010, you were one of the few voices in American academia to warn Turkish liberal intellectuals about the authoritarian direction that Erdoğan’s leadership was inclined to. Could you please remind us about your warnings that were ignored by Turkish liberal intellectuals at that time?

I was convinced during the headscarf controversy of 2008 that Turkey could continue on the road to democratization only if a process of consensual constitution making, abandoned already in 2007, could be resumed. I interpreted the Constitutional Court’s decision as an implicit call for high level of consensus if the permanent articles of the Constitution were to be reinterpreted. Admittedly, it was possible to interpret the same decision as simply a defense of the old state order. But that was contradicted by the same court’s refusal to dissolve the AKP. Nevertheless, the leaders of that party, along with many liberal intellectuals, continued to see the court as an enemy. The 2010 referenda, to me, represented an attempt to conquer yet another branch of the separation of powers, the judiciary. I saw the more attractive provisions of the package as window dressing for a monolithic project. It was already clear to me that this project aimed at a version of hyper-presidentialism and sought to remove all impediments in its way, especially the judiciary that established its jurisdiction over constitutional amendments. We have now seen many more attempts to realize the same project, either by constitutional change or by the establishing of a de facto hyper-presidential system. The first attempt failed so far, while the second succeeded.

Why do you think Turkish liberal intellectuals and those intellectuals abroad who were aggressively supporting Justice of Development Party during the democratization process in Turkey failed to see Erdoğan’s real intentions?

They understandably failed to see the logic of his actions — I don’t know about intentions — because of their own conflict with the military tutelage. They saw the Constitutional Court as merely an instrument of that tutelage, even though already in the 1970’s the Court had its battles with the military-bureaucratic structures, though the Court made several decisions supporting the AKP’s positions (in 2007, e.g., the quorum decision was soon balanced by the one permitting the referendum on the presidency) and refused to dissolve the party in 2008, admittedly in a very close vote. These intellectuals, as I said in an interview, were still fighting the battles of yesterday, rather than the coming one, that I very sadly but correctly predicted. They did not understand that in the Turkish system, especially with a hegemonic party, the court and the judiciary were important counter-weights.

How would you describe the political system in Turkey considering Erdoğan’s position in the system? Do you think it’s already an autocracy?

We must be careful here. Between June 7 and Nov. 1, you really did have an autocratic process, the roots of which went back to 2007, when the presidency was captured, and to 2010 when the judiciary was packed and disciplined. However, the primary purpose of the recent repressive moves; attacks on the police, judges, the press and ordinary citizens, was an effort to avoid injuring corruption and to win an election when the party was losing support. We will have to see if after Nov. 1 if there will be a relaxation of these measures. On one hand, they have been deeply damaging for the Turkish economy. On the other hand, without continuing in this manner, either version of the hyper-presidentialist dream — constitutional or de facto — may not be realizable. The AKP still does not have the three-fifths constitution-amending majority. Nor is the de facto version that continually faces legitimization problems sustainable without repression and intimidation. So what we have is a hard democracy, a “demokradura” (a term used in Latin America to call authoritarian rule or low-intensity democracy), that bordered a soft dictatorship in the past few years of Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule and can develop in either of these two directions. A lot depends on the actors, the other parties, the AKP itself but also civil society groups.

You had warned that sidelining the military might not necessarily result in more democracy but more authoritarianism. How did you predict that? What were your data and perspective to analyze that?

Let me correct you if I may, because this is the usual misunderstanding. I never warned about sidelining military tutelage. My critics read me this way because they identified the court as an instrument of the old regime. Yes, the military was a kind of check on the AKP’s ambitions, for a while, but not in favor of democratization. I, however, did see the court as a part of the democratizing logic. Sidelining the court and the judiciary obviously had an authoritarian tendency, and that is what I noticed during the conflicts from 2008 to 2010. Some of my friends in Turkey spoke of juristocracy, the rule of judges, when nothing could be further from reality in their country.

Do you think the leadership style of Erdoğan was ignored by academia to further predict his tendencies and intentions?

I don’t know how they could have ignored it; his authoritarian tendencies were so obvious in contrast to Abdullah Gül’s style, for example. For a lot of people of course, populist demagogy is seductive. Generally it is not for academic intellectuals. So this blindness too must have been a functioning part of the conflicts with the old regime.

Even despite not being elected as an executive president, Erdoğan is acting like an executive president. Do you think there is any veto player left to counter-balance Erdoğan’s power in the system?

Yes, you are right. The old regime’s institutions not fully reformed, and the subservience of the AKP elite allows this to happen, and Mr. Erdoğan, quite frankly, claimed to operate within a de facto presidential system. The legality of this is doubtful, and its legitimacy nonexistent. Right now it is only Turkish society, and on some issues other countries that can interfere with this project. Turkey has many independent parties, civil society institutions, intellectuals and they can oppose authoritarian measures the way society and social movements oppose, by demonstrations and mobilizations, and by building grassroots support for democratic parties like now the CHP (Republican People’s Party) and certainly the HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party). Admittedly, other countries have been very tolerant so far, because of Turkey’s importance as an ally and as an immigration gatekeeper. But sending 50 special forces to Kurdish-held territory in Syria is a warning: the US cannot accept the bombing of one of its very few allies, the PYG, by Turkey.

Do you think the military is entirely sidelined?

I don’t know. This may be a factor in why the government will not continue in the very same direction as they did between the two elections. There is too much internal strife, and the continuation of a useless and unwinnable war with the PKK, especially when the Kurds led by the HDP are ready to negotiate, may not be or may not remain very attractive to a military that probably still has its American links. Even if the top commanders are sidelined, there are also other levels as in any military that may wish to act. As we see in Egypt, however, the medicine may be worse than the disease itself.

Do you think democracy is in decline all over the world? Does the international system also impact the decline of democracy in Turkey?

There is a current anti-democratic trend in several countries. I leave to the side countries that have for a long time not been democratic, like Algeria and Iran, not to speak of China. Russia, Turkey and Hungary in the forefront of a new trend, but they are not alone. Only Tunisia managed a democratic transition after the Arab Spring. In Latin America Venezuela is another important case of increasing authoritarianism. In Europe, especially because of the immigration crisis, anti-democratic populist parties pose danger almost everywhere. This trend did not in itself cause the decline of democracy in Turkey but increases the tolerance for it, especially given still alive Orientalist assumptions in the West. Moreover, the new populist authoritarians tend to support one another even when they have potential conflicts, too, as in the case of Orban and Putin, Orban and Erdoğan, and even Putin and Erdoğan.

Turkey’s multi-party system began in parallel with the Truman doctrine and NATO membership process. How do you think Erdoğan’s tendencies might affect Turkey’s relations with NATO and the US?

The press and NGO’s in Europe and America often criticize his internal policy, but governments, unfortunately, are too tolerant. It is in the foreign policy area, especially the ambivalent relationship to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and the uncompromising attitude to the Kurds that may cause trouble for Erdoğan. But it can only be domestic forces and pressures, including economic ones that have a chance to restrain him. He makes a lot of mistakes, in both domestic and foreign policy. It was a huge mistake to repress the Gezi movement the way he did, and to start the struggle with the Gulen movement. It will also be a big mistake to continue on the path of either repression or war after the elections. It would be another mistake to resist a Russian-American-European-Iranian deal over Syria, along with Saudi Arabia. It is these mistakes that will make his regime unstable and vulnerable regardless of how strong it looks today.

Do you have any hope for Turkey? Do you have further warnings and predictions for Turkey?

I think I already said what I wanted to say. Turkey is a wonderful country, full of promise and potential, in culture, economy, and yes in politics, too. I just don’t see how the authoritarian project of primarily one man, supported by a pliant party, can succeed for a long time in such a setting. The strategy worked to win a single election just like a protection racket works. The supposed protectors cause the disorder and instability, but tell the voter that only they can end it. In the short run this perhaps appears convincing. So the citizens (about half of the voters) voted for the force offering protection. But in the middle term people can come to understand this logic, and that the sources of the dangers to them, foreign and domestic, are the protectors themselves.”

Interview reprinted with permission from Today’s Zaman.