EssaysFeatureMobilities

The Arc of Protection

Introduction: Toward a New International Refugee Regime

PS Books is proud to be publishing a draft of a pathbreaking study of the international refugee crisis, along with informed commentary by a group of the leading experts in the field. This post introduces the draft. Later today and next Tuesday, we will publish the five chapters as a series. The commentaries will follow. We are experimenting here, presenting a preview of a book, for comments, to which Aleinikoff and Zamore will respond in the final version of their book. For this reason, they welcome and are especially interested in responses from our readers. —Jeff Goldfarb

The world is facing record numbers of persons displaced by conflict and violence, while the international refugee regime — put in place during the post-World War Two era to provide international protection and assistance — is fundamentally broken. States have adopted policies to deny, deter, and detain asylum seekers. Persons recognized as refugees are routinely denied rights guaranteed by international law. A humanitarian system established to provide emergency care is now called upon to render services for long and indefinite periods of time. Perhaps most fundamentally, no formal process or dependable practice of international responsibility-sharing — vital to finding solutions to refugee situations and to ensuring the dignified and lawful treatment of refugees in the interim — currently exists. The result is that millions of refugees around the world experience a “second exile” — years spent in limbo with little opportunity to rebuild their lives or to contribute to the communities that host them. Most spend those years struggling to survive in just a handful of developing countries. The refugee crisis is not global; but the crisis of responsibility is.

In exploring these and other trends, we adopt a revisionist and critical perspective that examines the original premises of the international refugee regime and details how the regime has evolved, and devolved, over the past seven decades. We identify compromises at the founding of the system that attempted to mediate between and among humanitarian and development principles as well as the sovereign control by states over borders and membership decisions. We note that, in the early years, the tensions inherent in the system were largely avoided for a number of reasons (including Cold War imperatives and the limited, European-focus of the Refugee Convention). Today, however, these tensions have come front and center, and have helped to produce the systemic breakdown we are currently witnessing. To repair and reform the current system, we suggest returning to some of the regime’s foundational principles while transcending others. We argue for a focus on refugee rights, autonomy, and mobility. We also urge that changes are needed at the level of structures and institutions, especially when it comes to responsibility-sharing and to the infamous humanitarian-development divide.

We pursue these themes and conclusions within the following chapters.

Chapter One: The Inconvenient Refugee

The 1951 Refugee Convention is the centerpiece of the modern international refugee regime. Written in the aftermath of World War Two and the beginning of the Cold War, it provides a robust set of rights to persons who find themselves outside of their countries of origin and unable to return because of a fear of being persecuted. Yet the drafters of the Convention were well aware that such a broad humanitarian purpose would be realized within a context of state-based interests. Thus, the sovereign right of states to regulate their borders was not abridged, and refugees were not guaranteed membership in the states in which they were granted asylum. The Convention placed no obligations on third countries to assist states of asylum.

The system largely “worked” in its early years: Western states took in persons fleeing Eastern states and provided them with protection, and richer countries provided poorer (European) host states with unprecedented amounts of financial aid. Nor did the regime abide by its geographic or temporal limitations for long. But the tensions and idiosyncrasies built into the system — largely kept at bay in the early years — soon began to bubble over. Indeed, the welcome expansion of the concept of refugee precipitated a number of problematic shifts that, in effect, created a two-tiered refugee regime: the focus on assistance rather than rights; the movement away from a development paradigm aimed at protecting rights and expanding state services to a neoliberal approach that undercut the capacity of host states to provide for basic economic security; and the adoption of “ non-entrée” policies in the North that served to contain refugees in a few beleaguered states in the global South. We trace the emergence and evolution of these trends and underscore the extent to which they have paved the way for the current systemic failure.

Chapter Two: Protection, International Protection, and Necessary Flight

Scholars have developed a number of philosophical positions on the question of “who is a refugee?” Some attempt to provide a justification for the Convention’s narrow (if malleable) definition; others seek to expand the definition to any person who lacks the protection of his or her home country. We adopt the concept of “necessary flight,” and suggest that all persons forced to leave their homes because life there has become intolerable merit a response from the international community (this is a far larger class of persons than presently covered by the Convention). To say that a person warrants a response from the international community is not to say that all “fleers of necessity” are automatically entitled to all the rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention — although we argue that persons fleeing violence and conflict should be so guaranteed, even if they do not currently come within the Convention’s definition. International practice (OAU Convention, subsidiary protection in the EU) already supports this expansion.

The concept of necessary flight starts from the assumption that persons who flee their home states do so for a congeries of reasons and that legal (and moral) standards that seek to identify a single reason (e.g., fear of persecution) are artificial and under-inclusive. In asserting the concept, we critique the current mobilization of the terms “protection” (which is generally rendered in terms of a lack of protection at home) and “international protection” (which is understood to mean a surrogate for the protection denied at home). We find no basis for reading a lack of protection at home into the definition of refugee, and argue that international protection means the full set of rights (from the Convention, human rights law, and other international norms) to which fleers of necessity are entitled. We further juxtapose this definition of international protection both with the “modern standard account” and with the assistance-based regime that has supplanted the rights-based one throughout much of the world.

Chapter Three: Principles of Protection

The core concerns of international protection are often understood to be non-refoulement and international humanitarian assistance. We believe these elements, while front and center in today’s regime, cannot in themselves achieve the overall aim of international protection, which is to remedy the harms of forced displacement. We therefore offer a broader account, focusing first on three core commitments that can be derived from the original premises of the refugee regime: offering safe haven to necessity fleers who have escaped violence and other atrocities; enabling such persons to rebuild their lives or to provide for their welfare when they are unable to do so; and helping them exit from the category of uprooted altogether. We refer to these three elements of protection as: safetyenjoyment of asylum, and solutions. To these more established three, we add two more: enhancing the ability of the displaced to pursue opportunities for economic, educational, and social advancement through movement; and ensuring that those displaced have a role in crafting the international and domestic responses to their displacement. We refer to these two additional commitments as mobility and voice.

Together, these five commitments recognize and seek to protect refugee agency and to restore the hope and possibility of human flourishing. Starting from these commitments gives a dynamic reading to the concept of international protection, and one distinct from the view (frequently asserted) that the core concern of international protection is non-refoulement and international humanitarian assistance. To us, the success of international protection is when it puts itself out of business. In this story, rights play an essential role, but they are one of several means to a larger end.

Chapter Four: The Responsibility to Solve

If the international refugee regime is failing, whose job is it to fix it? We press several arguments as to why states, and especially powerful states (as well as their international organizations), have a responsibility to mend the system that they have created and through which they control the movement, reception, and lives of the forcibly displaced. Our argument is to some degree a legal one, focusing on instruments and doctrines that have some force in international law. Perhaps more importantly, we make claims based on functionalism (what the protection regime requires, in a deep sense, if it is to stop failing) and on principle (one that attempts to provide a “moral fulcrum” for change).

We focus, in particular, on protracted refugee situations, with the aim to establish whether there exists either a “right to a solution” or a “responsibility to solve.” The root problem, we show, is that there can be no right not to be a refugee unless and until there is a corresponding duty on some country, some political association, to take a refugee in and to make her a member. But, we argue, that is largely because we still live in an Arendtian world where rights are understood to be state-provided; solutions, by contrast, are collective undertakings. Thus, we zero in on the responsibility of the international community, rather than a right of a refugee (or a concomitant obligation of a host state only). We present three interrelated arguments in support of what we call the “responsibility to solve.” The first flows from the human harms imposed on those left in the limbo of refugee status for an extended period of time; the second focuses on principles that underlie the international protection regime (the goal of a solution, and burden-sharing); and the third derives from specific commitments of members of the UN General Assembly and signatories to the Convention to cooperate with UNHCR in seeking solutions.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

Over the past 70 years, we have witnessed substantial movement forward along the arc of protection — at least in certain respects. Today, more displaced persons are being assisted by more actors in more ways and for long periods of time than at any point in history. It is thus an extreme irony that the system is largely in disarray, betraying its founding principles and enduring goals. A regime intended to put people back on their feet keeps them on their knees. A system of protection intended to guarantee the return to normal life has produced a surreal existence for the vast majority of displaced persons, condemned to life in perpetual limbo. The country of first asylum — the place of rescue — has become, for most refugees, a place of confinement where they are both locked in and locked out: unable to return safely home and forbidden to move elsewhere, they are also denied entry into economic opportunities and social programs in hosting communities. Humanitarian programs have supplanted rights-based approaches, producing deprivation instead of dignity. Economic programs have retreated even further from their welfarist origins, too often prioritizing global markets instead of the global poor.

Plainly, dramatic measures are needed to repair this broken system. The programs for reform proposed by those with most of the world’s resources — the global North — are likely to reinforce rather than remedy the fundamental failings of the current state of affairs. We leave to one side proposals that would move the system backwards on the arc of protection — that would cut back on the definition of refugee, adopt encampment policies, or restrict established refugee rights. We examine instead what we label the New Liberal Consensus on reform of the refugee regime — and show how it, too, has the tendency to serve as a maintainer of an intolerable and unworkable status quo. In its stead, we offer a series of proposals that, we think, are capable of addressing the underlying challenges of the international protection regime.

T. Alexander Aleinikoff is University Professor and Director of the Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility at The New School.
Leah Zamore directs the humanitarian program at the Center on International Cooperation.

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Alex Aleinikoff

  • Dana Schmalz

    Thank you very much for sharing the draft of the book, I enormously enjoyed reading it. In particular the five principles, in their organization of 3+2, I find very illuminating in how they capture the developments and frame the reflections. I will not mention all the points in which I find the draft insightful and convincing, and hope it is not impolite to jump to a few things I kept pondering about:

    – The category of necessary fleers / necessary flight: I see the aim of finding a description that unites the numerous concepts and practices of protection that go beyond the refugee definition of the GRC. But the notion seems problematic to me. Flight or fleeing includes per se an element of involuntariness, that is what distinguishes it from migration more generally. I understand that the notion is supposed to stress how the decision to flee usually builds on a bundle of reasons and factors. But I wonder if the addition of “necessary” does not ultimately add a requirement rather than broaden the understanding: It seems to move the necessity always present in the notion of fleeing from a subjective to an objective level. Not the felt necessity inherent in the notion of flight but the objective ex post perspective that the flight was indeed necessary would then decide if a person is inside or outside the category of those entitled to protection. Of course law will always operate with objective benchmarks. But I am not sure if the element of objective necessity achieves what you want.

    – I find the opening with reference to a state of nature in opposition to a world of states a little confusing. Would we not have to distinguish between a state of without rules/law (if such exists among humans) and a situation without the order of states, which might be a different political order, but with law?

    – The considerations about the history of the protection concept in Chapter 2 I found particularly insightful. Regarding the history of non-refoulement in Chapter 3, I was wondering if it would make sense to take into account the normative history strand of non-extradition as well. From my understanding the two strands merged in the IRO statute and the Geneva Refugee Convention. Which might add to your argument of why non-return should not be seen as the sole core of the GRC.

    – Role of humanitarian assistance: There seems to be a certain tension in the argument most graspable in Chapter 5 – on the one hand, the story is that refugee protection has progressed and is progressing, on the other hand, that the system is deeply dysfunctional. As part of the progress, the role of humanitarian assistance is stressed, the more persons than ever before are assisted – at the same time, the reflections about “second exile” pinpoint this growing sector of humanitarian assistance as part of the problem. While there are distinctions and explanations of how these two views go together, the book could maybe do more in addressing the structural issues involved. That humanitarian assistance relies on funding, but that this dependence on funding is also an incentive of keeping persons counted as refugees and separate from the local population. The need to enable more mobility and the need to secure the funding of humanitarian assistance are surely not alternative. But how can policies prevent that the latter ultimately harms the former?

    – I like the proposals in Chapter 5 along the points norms, rights, agency and mobility, and responsibility. I also like the description of perspective in the introduction: “to zero in on the responsibility .. rather than the right of the refugee”. Firstly, this focus on responsibility might be interesting to connect with arguments from theoretical human rights scholarship that we should be talking less about rights and more about obligations (like Samuel Moyn). Secondly, this initial framing might also be interesting to take up at the end with regard to these proposals – in how they go together, especially how responsibility, norms and rights (with the role of courts) relate.

    Again, thank you for sharing the draft and I very much look forward to reading the final book.

    Dana

  • Dana Schmalz

    Thank you for sharing this draft of the book, I enormously enjoyed reading it. In particular the five principles, in their organization of 3+2, I find very illuminating in how they capture the developments and frame the reflections. I will not mention all the points in which I find the draft insightful and convincing, but jump to a few points I kept pondering about:

    – The category of necessary fleers / necessary flight: I see the usefulness of a description that unites the numerous concepts and practices of protection that go beyond the refugee definition of the GRC. But I am not entirely convinced by the term “necessary fleers” / “necessary flight”. Flight or fleeing seems to include per se an element of involuntariness, that is what distinguishes it from migration more generally. I understand that the term is supposed to stress how the decision to flee usually builds on a bundle of reasons and factors. But I wonder how the addition of “necessary” affects the understanding – especially if it would not end up adding a requirement. It seems to move the necessity always present in the notion of fleeing from a subjective to an objective level. Not the felt necessity inherent in the notion of flight but the objective ex post perspective that the flight was indeed necessary would then decide if a person is inside or outside the category of those entitled to protection. Of course law will always operate with objective benchmarks. But I am not sure if this element of objective necessity benefits the aim of a very inclusive description.

    – I find the opening with reference to a state of nature in opposition to a world of states a little confusing. Would we not have to distinguish between a state of without rules/law (if such exists among humans) and a situation without the order of states, which might be a different political order, but with law?

    – The considerations about the history of the protection concept in Chapter 2 I found particularly insightful. Regarding the history of non-refoulement in Chapter 3, I was wondering if it would make sense to take into account the normative history strand of non-extradition as well. From my understanding the two strands merged in the IRO statute and the Geneva Refugee Convention. Which might add to your argument of why non-return should not be seen as the sole core of the GRC.

    – The role of humanitarian assistance: There seems to be a certain tension in the argument most graspable in Chapter 5 – on the one hand, the story is that refugee protection has progressed and is progressing, on the other hand, that the system is deeply dysfunctional. As part of the progress, the role of humanitarian assistance is stressed, that more persons than ever before are being assisted – at the same time, the reflections about “second exile” pinpoint this growing sector of humanitarian assistance as part of the problem. While there are distinctions and explanations of how these two views go together, the book could maybe be more explicit in addressing this tension and the structural issues involved. That humanitarian assistance relies on funding, but that this dependence on funding is also an incentive of keeping persons counted as refugees and separate from the local population. The need to enable more mobility and the need to secure the funding of humanitarian assistance are surely not strict alternatives. But how can policies prevent that the latter ultimately harms the former? Possibly reflections about structures of funding would clarify that point, but it seems to me that the otherwise very convincing point of a platform, of planning ahead… does not as such resolve the ambivalent role of humanitarian assistance.

    – I very much like the proposals along the points norms, rights, agency and mobility, and responsibility. I also like the description of perspective in the introduction: “to zero in on the responsibility .. rather than the right of the refugee”. Firstly, this might be interesting to connect with arguments from theoretical human rights scholarship that we should be talking less about rights and more about obligations (like Samuel Moyn). Secondly, this initial framing might also be interesting to take up at the end in these proposals and explain how they go together, especially how responsibility, norms and rights (with the role of courts) relate.

    Again, thank you for sharing the draft, I very much look forward to reading the book!

    Dana

  • DPSnyder

    You folks are getting pretty good at cranking out important documents quickly! Congratulations. I am sharing widely.

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